The Legal Status of the Human Tissues Removed From the Body: An annotated bibliography.
As I was going through this article. I noted that it talks about all the legal details of human tissues as propery. Just about all of the articles and things of that I have found have all been about the legal aspect of owning human tissues. They all have pretty much told me the same thing. This one has talked about the Italian civil code I do believe and even other codes of conduct. It also talks about Italians that have made contributions to this status.





Dott. Matteo Macilotti,
Department of Legal Studies
Trento University
The Legal Status of the Human Tissues Removed From the Body
My reasearch deals with the legal status of human tissues material removed from human
body. The study of the relationship between human body and human tissue materials
detached from the body allows to analyse the relationship among the property rights and
the rights of personality. Historically, when the informational capacity of the human
genome was still unknown, human tissues were considered as an aggregate of molecules.
Therefore the law placed emphasis on the material nature of tissues. This is why even the
scholarship has never doubted that the relationship between the donor and the removed
tissues should be based on ownership rights.
Scientific knowledge has revolutionised this perspective, demonstrating the huge
informational capacity contained within the tissues. Thus, from the physical dimension the
emphasis has now been shifted to the informational dimension. From simple aggregates of
molecules, tissues are now considered as a source of data. Such a “dematerialised” vision
of human tissues makes legal protection of removed tissues essential not only in terms of
property rights, but also in terms of the protection of personality and of the right to privacy.
Once removed from the body, human tissues are to be considered as autonomous and
independent entities, given that researches and interventions led on them do not directly
compromise the health of the human body from which they have been separated. For these
reasons Article 5 of the Italian Civil Code cannot be applied in case of removed tissues,
given that it regulates actions on human body considering its integrity.
The Italian scholarship before the formulation of the Art. 5 agreed on the free nature of
human tissues after their removal, whenever they do not imply a decrease in physical
integrity (i.e. tissues removed during surgical intervention or routine diagnosis)1. Once the
tissues are removed, like other goods, they are property of no one and whoever possesses
them becomes their owner2.
The vexata quaestio was the way for obtaining the property. The so called separation
theory advanced by Carnelutti in the 1930s recognizes the property rights on the removed
1 CARNELUTTI, Problema giuridico della trasfusione del sangue, in Foro it., 1938, IV, 95; BIANCA,
Diritto civile, 1, La norma giuridica. I soggetti, Giuffrè, 1978, 163, DOGLIOTTI, Atti di disposizione sul
proprio corpo e teoria contrattuale, in Rass. dir. civ., 1990; SANTORO PASSARELLI, Dottrine generali del
diritto civile, Jovene, 1964, 52. CRISCUOLI, L’acquisto delle parti staccate del proprio corpo e gli artt. 820-
821 c.c., in Riv. dir. fam., 1985, XIV, 271.
2 TALLACCHINI, Bodyright. Corpo biotecnologico e biodiritto, in Biblioteca della libertà, 1998,
XXXIII, 24; Rizzo, Atti di disposizione del corpo e tecniche legislative, in Rass. dir. civ., 1989, 618, 622.
material to the individual from which it has been taken, according to the jus in se ipsum.
According to this interpretation, when the tissue is removed from the donor, in that very
moment the individual from which the material is taken is considered the owner of the part
removed from the body. This thesis has been approved by the Italian Court during the
1960s3. The Court established that the patient is the owner of the biological materials
removed during surgery.
A second hypothesis identifies parallelisms between the rights in removed tissues and the
rights on ideas4. According to the legislative interpretation of the article 2576 of Italian
Civil Code, individuals should be considered the owner of their own biological tissues in
the same way in which they are the owner of their own ideas. According to this legal
assumption, removed tissues are still property of the patient. Therefore, the patient should
be considered as the owner of human tissues, even if they were removed with the help of a
surgeon.
Another thesis considers removed tissues as “natural fruits”, or fruits that originate directly
from the owner's body, eventually with the help of surgery (articles 820 and 821 of Italian
Civil Code)5.
All the thesis mentioned agree on the fact that biomaterials have to be considered in the
same way as any other material wealth6. Historically, these thesis are the consequences of
previous believes that considered biomaterials as surgeon waste. Therefore, from a legal
standpoint, the focus lied on the material nature of human tissues. This is the reason why
even the most advanced Italian scholarship has never doubted that the relationship between
the donor and the removed tissue should considered as ownership rights.
However, after the development of genetics studies and research technologies, biological
materials begun to be considered as a valuable source of medical and genetic data,
contributing to the progress of medical sciences7. These data contain useful information
about the patient such as health, biological identity, predisposition to specific diseases and
paternity. Human tissues deliver biological identity. The same biological identity remained
also after separation from human body. In fact tissues contain the gene pool of the body
they have been removed from. Therefore, from an informational point of view, the
separation of human tissues from the human body, does not imply the complete autonomy
3 Trib. Milano, 17.4.1961, in Temi rom.,1961, n. 37, 141.
4 SANTORO PASSARELLI, Dottrine generali del diritto civile, Jovene, 1964, 52.
5 CRISCUOLI, L’acquisto delle parti staccate del proprio corpo e gli artt. 820-821 c.c., in Riv. dir.
fam., 1985, XIV, 271.
6 SALARIS, Corpo umano e diritto civile, Giuffrè, 2007, 506.
7 RODOTÀ, La vita e le regole, Tra diritto e non diritto, 2006, 81.
of the biological materials from the original body, but simply the opportunity of its
autonomous circulation.
From a descriptive point of view the double relationship between individuals and tissues
and between individuals and information related to the samples can be considered as a
“belonging relationship”8. The property should be considered as a border aspect of the
more general concept called “belonging”9. In the property relationship, the owner and the
owned object are two separate entities. The highest level of “belonging” exists when there
is a correspondence between owner and owned object. This is also the case of personality
rights which are not distinguished from the individual who owns the rights, but are parts of
his identity.
The law considers personality rights as external objects to one’s identity. But, this is only a
fictio, for applying the legal structure of subjective rights, that is shaped on the property
rights’ structure. This legal structure foresees the non-identity between person and object of
right10.
Biological samples entertain therefore two types of relationships with human body. They
entertain a material relationship, which is based on property rights and an informational
one’s, based on personality rights.
This distinction can be found also at an economical level. Biological sample is a good that
consumes entirely within a certain time. Personal data (related to the tissues), “survive”
even if the relative tissues are consumed. The informed consent of the donor for processing
personal data does not imply any real property right for the researcher. It imply simply a
right to use these data within the limits established from the norms ruling personal data
protection. The consent of the donor doesn’t imply the property right of the donor on
material, but an individual right to protect his own privacy11.
The bi-dimensional nature characterising human tissues, both considered as a molecular
aggregates and source of genetic data, represents the main problem in the definition of the
8 ZATTI, Il corpo e la nebulosa dell’appartenenza, in Nuova Giur. Civ. Comm., 2007, II; GROSSI,
Tradizioni e modelli nella sistemazione post-unitaria della proprietà, in Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del
pensiero giuridico moderno, 1978, nn. 5-6, 265 ss.; BESSONE, Diritto soggettivo e droits de la personnalité,
in Id., Saggi di diritto civile, Giuffrè, 1979, 163.
9 SCOZZAFAVA., I beni e le forma giuridiche di appartenenza, Milano, 1982, 2.
10 GOLD, Body Parts: Property Rights and the Ownership of Human Biological Materials,
Georgetown University Press, 1998, 31; BERSON, The Taking of Human Tissue for Research and Commerce:
A Comparison of U.S. And French Approaches, 10 Wisconsin Inter. L. J., 348 (1992).
11 SUTER, Disentangling Privacy From Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic
Privacy, 72 Georg. Wash. L. Rew., 737 (2004); LAURIE-MASON, Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body
and its part in the Shadow of Bristol and Alder Hey, 64 Med. L. Rev., 10 (2001); CALABRESI, Una
introduzione al pensiero giuridico: quattro approcci al problema del regime giuridico delle parti del corpo,
in Riv. crit. dir. priv., 1991, 755
relationships between individuals and removed tissues. It is thus essential to establish if
these two dimensions can be ruled by the same legal rules or not.
The choice of a separate legislation for the bi-dimensionality of human tissues depends on
the possibility that these two dimensions can circulate separately. If that result impossible,
it would be better to identify a common regulation able to protect both the dimensions. In
this case the material dimension would prevail on the informational one. In fact the
regulations on the informational field are much more restrictive, given the importance of
ensuring the safe processing of personal data in order to protect the donor’s privacy.
From the material point of view in fact, the researches on biomaterials do not jeopardise
patient’s health. The impossibility of treating the two dimensions separately implies that
the one subjected to a more restrictive legislation absorbs the other12. Therefore the
informational dimension absorbs the material one. The biological sample becomes a
physical support containing data. This “de-materialization” makes legal personality
protection essential in terms of rights to privacy and self-determination. The legislation
moves its focus from property rights to personality rights.
An example is represented by the recent Authorization of the Italian Privacy Authority on
the use of genetic data. According to this latter, human tissues have to be destroyed
whenever the consent of the donor concerning data processing for medical research is
withdrawn. The destruction of the data is ruled by an authority protecting personality
rights. It bear out the absorption of the material dimensions within the personality rights
protection system. The law system ruling the individual-biological sample is based on the
strong connection of these two dimensions, but it would be restrictive to consider this
inseparability within the mere personality rights protection system. In fact it would mean to
associate the material dimension to a law discipline that rules the informational dimension
and therefore consider tissues as mere informational entities which work as physical
supports.
12 TALLACHINI, Bodyright. Corpo biotecnologico e biodiritto, in Biblioteca della libertà, XXXIII,
1998, 24.
ANDREWS L.B., NELKIN D, Body Bazaar: The Market of Human Tissue in The
Biotechnology Age, New York, 2001
ANDREWS L, NELKIN D., Il mercato del corpo, Il commercio dei tessuti umani nell’era
biotecnologia, Milano, 2002
ANDREWS L., Two Perspectives: Rights of Donors: Who Owns Your Body? A Patient's
Perspective on Washington University v. Catalona, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 398 (2006)
CALABRESI G, Una introduzione la pensiero giuridico: quattro approcci al problema del
regime giuridico delle parti del corpo, in Riv. crit. dir. priv., 1991, 755
CARNELUTTI F., Il problema giuridico della trasfusione del sangue, in Foro it.,IV, p. 89,
1938
CRISCUOLI G., L'acquisto delle parti staccate del proprio corpo e gli art. 820-821 c.c., in
Riv. dir. fam., XIV, 1985, 271
D’ADDINO SERRAVALLE , Atti di disposizione del corpo e tutela della persona umana,
Napoli, 1983
D’ARRIGO, Il contratto e il corpo: meritevolezza e liceità degli atti di disposizione
dell’integrità fisica, in Familia, 2005, n. 4, 777
DE CUPIS A., Teoria generale, diritto alla vita e all’integrità fisica, diritto sulle parti
staccate dal corpo e sul cadavere, diritto alla libertà, diritto all’onore e alla riservatezza,
Milano, 1959
DOGLIOTTI M., Atti di disposizione sul proprio corpo e teoria contrattuale, in Rass. dir.
civ., 1990, 291
EISEMBERG, Proprietary Rights and Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, in Yale
L.J., 1987, 97, 181
FERRANDO G., Diritto e scienze della vita. Cellule e tessuti nelle recenti direttive europee,
in Familia, 2005, 1157
GALASSO A., Biotecnologie e atti di disposizione del proprio corpo, in Familia, 2001, 933
GAMBARO A., La proprietà. Beni, proprietà, comunione, in Trattato di diritto privato, (a
cura di) IUDICA-ZATTI, Milano, 1990, 41
GOLD R.E., Body Parts: Property Rights and the Ownership of Human Biological
Materials, Georgetown University Press, 1998
GOTTLIEB K., Human Biological Samples and the Laws of Property: The Trust as a Model
for Biological Repositories, in WEIR R.F., Stored Tissue Samples: Ethical, Legal and
Public Policy Implications, University of Iowa Press, 1998
GREENFIELD D.L., Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital: Unjust Enrichment and the
Patenting of Human Genetic Material, 15 Annals of Health Law, 213 (2006)
GROSSI P., Tradizioni e modelli nella sistemazione post-unitaria della proprietà, in
Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, nn. 5/6, Tomo I, 1978,
265
HARRISON H., Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating
Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 77 (2002)
HARDCASTLE R., Law and the Humam Body, Hart publishing, 2007, 110
HARDIMAN R., Toward the Right of Commerciability: Recognizing Property Rights in the
Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 209 (1986)
HELLER M., EISENBERG R., Proprietary Rights and the Norm of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 Yale L.J., 177 (1987)
LAURIE G.T., MASON J.K, Consent or Property? Dealing with the Body and its part in the
Shadow of Bristol and Alder Hey, 64 Med. L. Rev., 10 (2001)
MACILOTTI M., Proprietà, informazione ed interessi nella disciplina delle biobanche a fini
di ricerca, in Nuova giur. civ., 2008, 222
MAGNUS D., CAPLAN L.A., MCGEE G., Who Owns Life?, New York, 2002
PAGANELLI M., Alla volta di Frankestein: biotecnologie e proprietà di parti del corpo, in
Foro it., 1989, IV, 417
PIRIA C., Gli interessi scientifici e patrimoniali su parti staccate dal corpo oggetto di
ricerche biotecnologiche, in Rass. dir. fam., XXI, 1990, 808
RAO R., Property, Privacy and the Human Body, 80 B.U.L. Rev. , 359 (2000)
RODOTÀ S., Tra diritto e società. Informazioni genetiche e tecniche di tutela, in Riv. Crit.
Dir. Priv., n. 4/2000, 578
RODOTÀ S., La vita e le regole. Tra diritto e non diritto, Milano, 2006
SCOZZAFAVA O.T., I beni e le forme giuridiche di appartenenza, Milano, 1982
TALLACHINI M., Bodyright. Corpo biotecnologico e biodiritto, in Biblioteca della libertà,
XXXIII, 1998, 24
TALLACHINI M., Il corpo e le sue parti. L’allocazione giuridica dei materiali biologici
umani, in Medicina e Morale 3 (1998), 499

I was sitting here tonight and as i looked at the clock I noticed that the time was 11:11 and so I made a wish without thinking about it. Well when i got done making the wish, I started to wonder where that had got started and I got curious to what some people thought of the meaning behind it. I decided to look into it a little and I found out that the number is considered to be a master or power number. Also in numerology I found out that the number number represents impractical idealism, visionary, refinement of ideals, intuition, revelation, artistic and inventive genius, fame, and some other things that I really did not know what they meant. I also came across some one's own opinion on the topic and they said that they thought that the number represents true love. This person said that when you are with someone and you see the number, while with them, then that symbolizes true love. Like I said that is there opinion on the number, and they are not a legit source that can be relied upon. I did find their opinion to be fascinating so that is why I added it. I actually thought that the whole thing was fascinating.

Adjusting

So tonight I was thinking about what all I have due for class tomorrow and I realized that I am going to be up all night and that I am overwhelmed. I did not realize this until just now. I now see that I need to get on top of all my assignments and quit procrastinating. I do not know how I have gotten so far behind but i need to figure it out. I need to just take a minute and make a schedule on times I have to spend doing all of this work. I am still trying to adjust to this lifestyle and I am not going to lie it is a lot harder than what I thought it was going to be. I believe that I might finally be getting used to it though.

Banking of Human Materials, Intellectual Property Rights and Ownership Issues: International Policy Positions and Emerging Trends in the Literature: Chapter 1: An annotated bibliography.

This article explains several different views on human tissue as human property. There are two main views; these views are human tissues as property from a personal right approach and the second is from a property rights approach. As I kept reading the article I found out that people started to claim intellectual properties as well as the tissues. This article talks about all of the legal aspects as well as personal rights to the claims of both intellectual properties and tissues as properties. I think that the article is a good one for discusing all of the legal parts of claiming these two things as property. The article is from a website in Canada: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-dppi.nsf/eng/ip00167.html. I do not know the author of the article.




Banking of Human Materials, Intellectual Property Rights and Ownership Issues: International Policy Positions and Emerging Trends in the Literature: Chapter 1
Pevious Table of Content Next
Section 1 - Emerging Trends in the Literature
In the context of this study, the terms "personal rights" and "property rights" approach reflect two different philosophical approaches of the relationship between a person and her or his body parts and material once they are removed from the body. In referring to these two approaches, one is not referring to explicit and comprehensive legal regimes but rather to philosophical bases that form the opposing ends of a scale along which are identified diverse legal regimes. Both the personal rights and the property rights approaches are based on certain preconceptions about the issues of the status of the human person and of human material and its commercialisation and patentability. In order to discern emerging trends and to understand why various policy approaches have been developed, then, we shall briefly overview the literature on the personal and property rights approaches, the proposed alternatives and the policy issues surrounding patenting.
Section 1.1 - Approaches to Ownership of Human Tissue
The legal relationship between a person and her or his bodily material once they are removed from the body, are generally of two types: a personal rights (§ A) or a property rights (§ B) approach.
§ A - Personal Rights Approach
A personal rights approach reflects both the classical Common Law and Civil Law enshrinement of the principle that the human person is not a commodity subject to property rights(12). Thus, in general terms, the legal status of human material may be negatively defined as being neither the person nor a commodity that can be appropriated, but rather a part of a person. It is this relation it maintains with the person from whom it originated that warrants that the integrity of the person still apply to the material once removed from the body. In a personal rights approach, an individual right to integrity includes respect for bodily material once removed from the body and still identifiable to that person. The mechanism employed to ensure respect and protection of the integrity of the person and of bodily material is informed consent. As a component of a person's integrity, personal dominion over bodily material will be ensured by requiring that the informed consent of the person from whom the material originated be secured and by providing remedies for any harm resulting from non compliance.
Yet, since the current legal doctrine of informed consent "fails to require disclosure regarding what will happen to the patient's body parts after they have been removed from her body"(13), an expansion of the informed consent doctrine(14) has been proposed in order to ensure respect for the person's integrity in removed bodily material. Hence, it is argued that a person's right to self-determination encompasses a "dignitary interest in one's body and extracorporeal body parts"(15). This includes the right to control what happens to excised tissues and cells, an interest wholly distinct and independent from property rights(16). An expanded doctrine of informed consent would impose a duty on the physician to disclose not only the risks and benefits associated with a certain medical treatment, "but also the proposed use, if any, of the patient's body parts."(17) The provisions of the new Civil Code of Quebec on consent, treatment and research(18) constitute an expansion of the informed consent doctrine with respect to bodily integrity and privacy since informed consent will need to be obtained prior to the subsequent use of any bodily material removed form the body during medical care.
In addition to respect for the inviolability and integrity of the person, additional sources of personal control over the disposal of bodily material and information are founded on respect for fundamental rights and freedoms such as the rights to liberty and privacy as found under public law(19). Indeed, the right to privacy provides protection for genetic material and information(20) since it protects against unwarranted intrusions on the body as well as unauthorised procedures to obtain information about a person.
§ B - Property Rights Approach
Strong arguments have also been made in favor of recognition of proprietary interests in extracorporeal material(21). It has been submitted that a property framework may be the most efficient way of protecting rights of patients and of research subjects since property law provides precise rights of control and thus would recognize people's interest in controlling what happens to their body parts(22). Principles of equity and fairness would be better served and unjust enrichment prevented(23). Characterizing body parts as property does not mean however, that they must be completely transferable as restrictions on alienability may be imposed(24). In this line of thought, a study paper presented to the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, maintains that rejection of the property approach to control over one's extracorporeal material stems from misconception of the modern concept of property(25). The legal concept of property refers not to material objects but to a bundle of rights, the "rights of control and domination over both tangible and intangible things or spheres of activity."(26) Viewed in terms of control over one's body, property rights enhance personal dignity rather than diminish it.
Prior to the French legislation of 1994(27), several French commentators on civil law had proposed a property rights approach to control over human genetic material. Accordingly, human genetic material is the person's property and may be the object of commercial transactions, even if they are gratuitous(28). Individuals maintain personal control over removed material from their bodies. Thus, abandonment or donation of tissue or bodily material may not be presumed but rather requires intentional abandonment or donation(29). Another author proposed that the legal regime of human genetic material be based on the legal regime of assigning property to a person, that is, that property has a formal assignment(30). Biological material is naturally assigned to a person's body. Even if removed from the body and detained by third persons, the natural assignment of human genetic material to the person will change only after the expressed consent of that person. Only when that human material is no longer assigned to a person may it be the object of commerce(31).
C - Alternative Approaches
Several interesting alternative approaches have been proposed by Canadian authors. In 1989, Marusyk and Swain proposed a three-tiered legal classification of human substances(32). The first level looks at the human body as a whole (including the persona). Thus the sum total of tissues, organs and genetic material that create a unique individual would "fall under the classification of property rights in that person" as long as the parts remain in that person. The second level of the legal structure covers res nullius, things without an owner. Bodily material removed from the body in a way that no longer serves the original possessor would fall into this category. Such extracorporeal material would become a corporal moveable owned by no one and ownership could be acquired by the first person to take possession of the material. The third tier of the legal structure characterizes bodily material permanently removed from the body as res communes omnium, the common property of all. This approach would prevent human material from becoming a marketable commodity but would allow a product derived from human material through labour and technology to generate property rights(33).
A somewhat similar approach to the three-tiered legal structure has been proposed by civil law commentators and may be translated as a theory of gradual distancing(34). This theory is directly rooted in Quebec civil law. It suggests that the human body be considered on three levels. When the body is a comprehensive entity, it follows the personal interests of the person. The second level of distancing, refers to body parts removed from the body that may be "alienated" and thus are no longer "parts of persons" but have become things. The gratuity of the alienation reflects the respect due to these bodily parts such as organs(35). At the third level of distancing, it is maintained that as the distance increases between the extracorporeal material and the person from whom it originated, the restrictions imposed on the circulation of the human material would decrease accordingly(36). General rules of property law and ownership would govern removed body parts once they are at the third level of distancing.
Finally, a report presented to the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies proposed a unique, sui generis regime for the qualification of the juridical character of an object(37). A sui generis interest need not have any particular characteristics as the utility of this category is precisely that courts may develop the law relating to a particular object on a case-by-case basis, "without the fetter of proprietary or other preconceptions."(38) However, "in practice ... sui generis interests, as they relate to objects, will always have proprietary characteristics. Some degree of control will be conferred on someone."(39) Maintaining that a property rights discourse should not be used with respect to human genetic material for symbolic as well as political reasons, the sui generis regime was submitted since it does not reject property principles, some of which are useful in defining the type of control over human material, and would afford courts latitude in interpretation without "evoking an unwarranted and unnecessary emotional debate."(40)
It should be noted that although possible economic value that is, commercialism, and property overlap, the former should not automatically be associated with the latter. Moreover, underlying the debate on the applicable legal regime is that of sale or gift of human material(41). Whether the gift philosophy prevails or rather the possibility of selling one's human material, underscores the role of the citizen in society, that is contributing freely to the common good or seeking to "profit" from one's materials. Whether or not the legal regime espoused is one of personal rights or of property rights may however be irrelevant as is evident in the contentious issue of patenting.
Section 1.2 - Approaches to Intellectual Property Protection
In recent years, the issue of patenting human genes has become increasingly controversial. The potential commercial exploitation of research in human genetics adds a certain urgency to the need to find a suitable means of protecting research results and stimulating such research while considering industrial and academic interests as well as the attendant controversial moral and ethical concerns surrounding the use(s) of human genetic material.
At the outset of the controversy, is the debate over the most suitable legal form of eventual intellectual property protection of human genetic material. The most widely sought protection has been that of patent rights, although strong arguments have been made in favour of copyright protection(42) and a hybrid or sui generis protection(43). During a 1995 UNESCO international workshop on legal systems of protection of research results in genetics, consensus seems to have been reached by the international commentators in favour of patent protection(44) for the results of human genetic research. Opting for protection through the patent system, appears to be in accordance with growing practice(45). In fact, as we will see below, under current European and US. patent laws, inventions derived from or containing human genetic material are generally considered as patentable subject matter by patent offices. In addition, human genes and DNA sequences of demonstrated purpose as well as related processes are patentable(46).
Despite this seemingly established practice, patent applications on DNA sequences remain controversial. The gene patenting controversy arises from international tension symptomatic of the opposing views and attitudes of government agencies (mostly US and European), researchers, industries, non governmental organisations and lay persons(47) , based not only on the property-person, sale-gift dichotomies, but also on differing interpretations of the actual and potential reach of patent law. While differences in US. and European patent laws may be at the source of some difficulties encountered in attempting to resolve this controversy, in general, competing arguments as found in the literature may be summarized under three headings: ethical, industrial policy, and legal.
A - Ethical Concerns
Opposition to the patenting of human genetic material is often based on the recognition of rights of ownership, that is exclusive rights of exploitation, over human biological material that are an intrinsic part of human beings(48). Strong ethical arguments against patenting genes are also based upon the premise that genes are the common heritage of mankind(49) and as such, may not be appropriated. Further arguments of privacy(50) and distributive justice(51) have also been raised. Interestingly, ethical concerns in favour of patenting have also been raised. Based on concepts of fairness and efficiency(52) , not rewarding researchers for work which eventually benefits society as a whole is deemed unethical. Controversy may stem from different perceptions of what it is that is being patented(53): life forms, genetic information, or an innovative process. In the event of genes of unknown function the distinction may be even harder to draw. As we will see below, however, the greatest challenge of the gene patent controversy is ensuring that these ethical concerns are considered.
B - Industrial Policy Concerns
Industrial policy arguments foresee several possible outcomes for gene patenting. A recent study notes that willingness in the United States to recognize and protect intellectual property rights in technological advances is a manifestation of the desire to advance genotechnology in the US(54). However, these authors recognize that "[t]o the extent that the PTO has de facto relaxed its requirements for genotech inventions and will issue more questionable pat ents, the rest of the industry bears the burden of either litigating the validity of these patent or entering into license agreements with those who hold them."(55) The validity of such patent applications remain unclear and controversial, as the unsuccessful NIH gene patent application, followed by that of the UK Medical Research Council, exemplifies(56). More importantly, the impact of gene patenting applications on the dissemination of genomic information and on international cooperation and collaboration is troublesome(57).
C - Legal Concerns
Turning to the legal debate as found in the legal literature, the determination of whether genes are patentable rests on two criteria: the first is the threshold criterion of patentable subject matter; and, the second, the technical criteria that refers to novelty, non-obviousness and utility (usefulness being the European counterpart) of any inventions(58). Of upmost interest for our purposes is the latter criterion. Several commentators have argued that the main issue will be to determine the degree of utility necessary for patenting. Here the debate turns on whether gene sequences of unknown function may be patented(59). Distinctions between fundamental and applied research are also at issue(60). Fundamental research has long been categorized as knowledge belonging to the public domain, "freely available for further use"(61), and thus unlike applied research, not patentable. Research in biotechnology, however, may be difficult to clearly categorize. It has also been suggested that human genes lack the novelty required(62) and that awarding patents over genetic material could hinder downstream patent applications over products eventually derived from genetic sequences(63). Other commentators argue that human genes will probably meet all the technical requirements(64) and that the "true" issue at stake is the threshold criterion of patentable subject matter(65). In fact, two American analysts recently wrote:
"Less certain is whether patent protection will be available for the discovery of a gene sequence or partial sequence. In the notorious genotech patent controversy involving the NIH's application for patents on partial gene sequences, the PTO rejected the applications based upon lack of utility, novelty or non obviousness -- not for lack of statutory subject matter. This reflects either the PTO's willingness to avoid the issue of statutory subject matter in this context or a substantiation of the contention that the historical distinction between discovery and invention has been eroded to a nullity."(66)
In addressing whether genes are patentable subject matter, the differences between the US. and European patent laws are manifest. European patent laws explicitly provide a criterion for exclusion from patentability for ordre public (public order) or morality motives, an ethical criterion that falls under the evaluation of the patent office(67). In contrast, US. patent law only has provisions with specific exclusions from patentable subject matter(68) and no such ethical criterion. Ethical considerations are only implicitly considered and consequently, as has been noted in US. patent law, "the threshold test [...] fails as an ethical safeguard"(69). While then, the role of ethical analysis differs, several commentators on both the European and US. patent systems believe this will have little effect on the issue of gene patenting. Indeed, several have concluded that under current legal threshold requirements, genes seemingly constitute patentable subject matter in both Europe and the US.(70). Furthermore, it has been suggested that the public order exclusion in the European Patent Convention was not designed for the resolution of such controversial issues and that the European Patent Office may in fact not be the appropriate body to undertake such complex universal pressing ethical analysis(71).
In short, as concerns human genetic material, the current literature holds that the patent law framework does not explicitly address important ethical concerns. A growing consensus seems to be that patent law is unable to serve as a tool to solve the controversy because of the limited attention paid to the underlying ethical and policy concerns(72) . Indeed, governmental intervention on national and international levels has been called for in order to reach an international consensus that might take several forms. One suggestion is to establish an international registry system, a "Human Genome Trust", to monitor genome progress and ensure collective "ownership" while permitting the co-existence of commercial development incentives(73) . Other propositions call for international agreements on a range of issues such as data sharing or limiting protection to the "moral" recognition of scientists who "discover" gene sequences(74) . As early as 1992, it was suggested that international agreements affirm that any rights to patented sequences be enforced only when the biologic function becomes known(75) .
Working toward such agreements will be difficult and time consuming, as exemplified by the recent rejection of the European Directive, as explained below(76) . However, the alternative case-by-case analysis by patent offices and subsequent case law may prove to be not only equally time consuming but also expensive. A policy or legislated resolution process would allow for extensive debate over these sensitive issues. This process has begun.



Banking of Human Materials, Intellectual Property Rights and Ownership Issues: International Policy Positions and Emerging Trends in the Literature: Chapter 2
Pevious Table of Content Next
SECTION 2 - Comparative Overview of Policy Positions
International and regional instruments/documents seldom bind national governments. Only national legislation or statutes (where they exist(77)), are binding. The absence of enforcement procedures further undermines the authority of these international and regional instruments. For example, while international conventions adopted by the United Nations bodies bind member States upon their signature and ratification, difficulties in ensuring their enforcement make the actual legal strength of these instruments quite limited. Moreover, declarations adopted by the United Nations bodies are not legally binding upon member states but rather have a moral pursuasive force(78). At the European level, the only body that binds member states is the European Parliament. Hence, had the draft European Directive of the Parliament on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions(79), been adopted, member European nations would have been bound by it and be required to modify or interpret their national legislation accordingly.
The reports of governmental commissions, agencies or working groups, recognized international, regional or local organizations, expert committees, and workshops, constitute the main source of policy positions. The common thread of all these texts is the formulation of recommendations following deliberation and study.
Thus, the vast majority of documents surveyed here, are not binding on governments. They find their value in the discussion and consensus work of groups of experts resulting in recommendations that have moral persuasion and normative influence since they reflect a consensus position. Such texts and their recommendations may also influence the legislative bodies during the drafting of legislation. In countries where legislation already exists, they may indicate possible interpretations or desirable amendments. This is especially true of instruments developed by bodies set up by governments either at the international, European or national levels. For example, even though the Council of Europe does not have legislative power to bind European nations by the recommendations(80) it adopts, it does reflect a consensus agreed upon following deliberations of experts from every member country, hence its moral strength. In contrast to the non binding nature of its recommendations, however, the Council of Europe's Draft Bioethics Convention will be upon adoption (since it is a convention), binding upon member states that sign and ratify the convention. Finally, at the national level, study papers and reports from commissions generally have consultative and interpretative force. The influence of these policy positions should not be underestimated in that they are often considered as "soft law" and as sufficient to provide normative guidance along with prevailing professional codes of ethics and practice guidelines. The perspectives found in these policy positions on the issues of property and persons with respect to the status of human genetic materials (2.1) and once banked with respect to possible intellectual property rights (2.2) reveal a gradual convergence toward similar solutions although coming from different positions.
Section 2.1- Perspectives on Property and Person Issues
Like in the general literature, the questions: "What is the legal basis for the right of the individual to determine what happens to his or her body?" "May human materials removed from the body be considered property, or ought they still be considered as part of the body and thus, of the person and controlled by that person's personal rights?", dominate policy discussions around the world.
With a few notable exceptions(81), these policy texts do not generally address the issue of ownership of bodily material by explicitly stating whether they adopt a property rights or a personal rights legal regime. Indeed, option for one or the other regime can only be inferred from the position taken on commercialism as the personal rights approach generally forbids any monetary compensation for human materials. Exceptions do exist, however, and commercial transactions are sometimes allowed under a personal rights approach while they are forbidden in a property rights regime. A survey of international (§ A), regional (§ B) and national policy positions (§ C) and legislation relevant to the transfer and banking of human material, will clarify the different positions.
§ A - International Positions
Among the few international organisations that have made statements on the status of human material, the tendency has been to present general policy positions rather than precise statements. In its 1991 Guiding Principals on Human Organ Transplantation(82), the World Health Organization adopted the position that the human body and its parts could not be subject to commercial transactions. Therefore, any giving or receiving of payments for organs a s well as any other commercial dealings in human tissues and cells should be prohibited by member states. With regard to human material used for genetic research, several other international bodies(83) have endorsed the spirit of a personal rights approach in one's bodily material and information derived therefrom by asserting the importance of respecting the will of persons participating and their right to decide on the extent of participation. Recently, the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO reiterated that "the human genome is a fundamental component of the common heritage of humanity"(84) but did not include a specific statement on commercialisation in its proposed Outline of a Declaration on the Human Genome and its Protection in Relation to Human Dignity and Human Rights.The preamble, however, incorporates a reference to general patent law principles and thus seemingly, does not exclude eventual commercial applications.
§ B - Regional Positions
At the regional European level, the Council of Europe has adopted a similar position in its recommendation on genetic testing and screening for health care purposes. It would require a person's permission for the further use of any sample collected for a specific medical or scientific purpose(85). But in contrast to the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee, the 1995 proposed Draft Bioethics Convention, explicitly affirms the principle of non-commercialism of the human body and its parts and substances(86). In addition, it states that the human body, its parts, organs and tissues may not be a source of profit through the trade of body parts for neither the individual source of the human material, nor for any third parties such as hospitals(87). However, the proposed prohibition would not extend to the sale of tissue that is part of a medical device nor to tissue considered as waste, such as hair and nails(88).
The Working Group on the ethical, social, and legal aspects of the European Commission's Programme on Human Genome Analysis(89), briefly addressed the more specific issue of ownership of materials collected for human genome analysis recommending that the issue be solved at the international level. Its 1991 report enunciated the guiding principle that "data and materials must be readily available to bona fide researchers" and that material be available at a nominal charge to cover the cost of distribution(90).
§ C - National Positions
Several European nations have taken specific positions on the ownership of bodily material once removed from the body. In France, bioethics legislation(91) adopted in July 1994 follows the position of the National Ethical Consultative Committee for the Life and Health Sciences(92) affirming the non-commercialisation of the human genome or of any parts of the person. This legislation most definitely adopts a personal rights approach as it clearly states that the human body and body parts may not be subject to patrimonial rights(93). Individuals maintain control over removed materials through the requirement of obtaining informed consent for the collecting of identifiable samples and the right to revoke such consent at any time(94).
Prior to the adoption of these bioethics laws, a report by the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research on The Intellectual Protection of the Results of Research on the Human Genome, Cell Collection and DNA Sequencing Data, (1994), also based its recommendations on the principle of "non-proprietorship of the elements and products of the human body"(95). Hence, not having any property rights in body parts, individuals should "donate" such substances and would be protected through consent procedures. In addition, this report clearly denied to every person involved in the collection of samples (donor, investigators or promoters), any proprietary rights in the material although the promoter (granting agency) would have other rights with respect to the collection(96).
In 1995, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, of the United Kingdom, published a report on the ethical and legal issues raised by the use of human tissue in medical research(97). In accordance with most European policy positions, commercialisation of tissue procurement should be prohibited except for certain removed body products such as hair and nails that may be bought and sold since they are common waste products(98). The Nuffield Council does not explicitly establish whether a person from whom tissue is removed retains any claim over the tissue. The report recalls that, in addition to rights over the actual removed tissue, "a person may also claim an entitlement to share in any benefits arising from the exploitation of the tissue removed and, where relevant, any consequent intellectual property rights. Abandonment and donation, however, do not ordinarily give rise to intellectual property rights."(99) However, it recommended that any claim over removed tissue should be examined on the basis of the consent given to the procedure resulting in the removal of the tissue and not on the basis of a property claim. It further specified that consent to medical treatment should be regarded as entailing the abandonment of any tissue removed. Finally, the Report noted that even though a property approach seems to have been endorsed in other UK. legislation, for example, that pertaining to human tissue, organ tra nsplantation and anatomy, any tissue removed from donors is given free of all claims(100).
As early as 1989, the Health Council of the Netherlands addressed the issue of cell banks in a large study on issues in human genetics(101). The Health Council while in favour of the adoption of a code of conduct setting out the legal position of the "donor" also sought to ensure that no unnecessary barriers to the use of banked cells for research were created. Furthermore, it recommended that written agreements should be made at the time of collection of samples setting out the specific rights of the donor, including, time of storage, use of material, confidentiality, withdrawal of consent, etc. In so far as consent procedures are favoured and no mention is made of any proprietary rights in banked material, can we infer that these early recommendations endorsed a personal rights approach to bodily materials?
In 1994, the Health Council of the Netherlands(102) seemingly rejected the notion of property rights over the human body as a whole(103). It considered that human tissue removed from the body as having a distinct "legal position"(104). In addressing this issue of the "legal position" of human tissue removed from the body, this report of the Health Council of the Netherlands centered its reflection on how an individual's right to self-determination might best be protected: through property law, contract law, or that of constitutional law protecting rights of the person(105). Although the Health Council did not take an explicit position on the legal status of human tissue, it did state that individuals have the right to determine what happens to identifiable material as a "personal right". Moreover, in commenting on its earlier 1989 report, it reiterated that "should exceptional cases arise in which [cell material] is identifiable, then the principle of non-commercialism means that the "donor" has no claims to any revenue that may be earned."(106)
In 1993, the Norwegian government issued a report on Biotechnology related to Human Beings(107) which was partially enacted into legislation(108) the following year. No specific provisions discuss banking. Even though current Norwegian transplant legislation does not contain a ban on commercial exploitation of organs or parts of organs(109), the 1993 report of the Norwegian government considered its stance to be in accordance with the European Draft Bioethics Convention(110) thus, endorsing the position that there be no commercial exploitation of such materials(111).
In the United States, the existence of possible legal claims of individuals whose tissue have been removed, has been particularly controversial. Moore v. Regents of the University of California(112) is a landmark case on this issue. In 1991, the Supreme Court of California overruled the Court of Appeal's recognition of Moore's proprietary interest in his cell line. The California Supreme Court granted Moore relief based on the doctor's breach of "fiduciary duty to disclose facts material to the patient's consent, or alternatively, on the performance of medical procedures without first having obtained the patient's informed consent."(113) In doing so, it examined the policy implications of recognizing individual property rights in cells, substances and body parts against the need to pursue medical research, advance scientific knowledge, and provide incentives for biotechnology industry.
Various policy positions in the United States demonstrate how controversial this topic has come to be. In fact, as early as 1987, the American Society of Human Genetics stated that "[b]anked DNA is the property of the depositor unless otherwise stipulated. Therefore, the word "donor", which implies a gift, is inappropriate."(114) A similar "property" position was also adopted in a proposed 1995 Genetic Privacy Act which provides that "an individ ually identifiable DNA sample is the property of the sample source,"(115) who has the right to order the destruction of the sample. Distancing itself from the preceding positions, a recent report commissioned by the National Institutes of Health and the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention(116) endorses a personal rights approach and discusses the components of an expanded informed consent. A recent statement by the American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG)(117) on storage and use of genetic material, adopts a similar approach. Avoiding all property-person discourse the ACMG statement makes recommendations on the scope of informed consent recognizing sample "sources'" right to control the outcome of their removed bodily material.
Turning finally to the Canadian context, the only legislation that deals with the status of human materials is the Civil Code of Quebec. It adopts a personal rights approach(118), that in fact constitutes an expansion of informed consent. Article 22 reads as follows: "A part of a body, whether an organ, tissue or other substance, removed from a person as part of the care he receives may, with his consent or that of the person qualified to give consent for him, be used for purposes of research." Hence, according to this provision, all types of research be it on nominative, anonymous or anonymized samples, requires that specific consent be obtained for the use of removed material until recently considered as waste.
Few reports deal directly with the issue of the legal status of human material removed from the body. In 1992, the report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada on the Procurement and Transfer of Human Tissues and Organs(119) (in conformity with most provincial legislation), recommended the general principles of altruism, voluntarism, gratuity and universality(120). More specifically, the Law Reform Commission recommended that the purchase or sale of human bodies, organs and other non-regenerative tissue should constitute a criminal offence(121). No mention was made however, of regenerative tissue. Finally, in cases where health providers, hospitals or researchers develop a commercial interest in a patient's tissue or cellular matter or where the development of any such interest is reasonably foreseeable, the health providers, hospitals or researchers should be obliged to disclose such an interest to the patient prior to obtaining his consent(122). The Law Reform Commission recognized that the issue of who should have commercial and patent rights to therapeutic products developed from human cells remains uncertain.
Closer to the issue of use of human genetic material, the 1991 Science Council of Canada report on genetics in Canadian health care, similarly endorsed the philosophy of gift-based donorship and warned against its possible undermining by the recognition of property rights in genetic material. Without taking a position on this debate, the Science Council emphasized that "even if genetic material were deemed property, the donor's claim in any commercial profits might be limited to the value of the tissues when they were removed."(123) Moreover, "extension of the donor philosophy would mean that genetic material could not be sold, and donors would not have commercial interest in products developed using their tissues."(124) It remains critical, however, "that in all cases, individuals have control over the use of their tissues, including use in research or in the development of commercial products."(125)
These two reports, together with comments by the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies(126), indicate that Canadian policy discourse generally endorses a personal rig hts approach to human genetic material via the endorsement of expanded informed consent. This approach is also reflected in current positions on banked human genetic material as recently stated by the Quebec Network of Applied Human Genetics of the FRSQ(127).
Section 2.2- Banked Materials and Patents
The issue of patenting human genetic material has raised greater debate at the international and national levels than has the legal status of such material. In fact, the Human Genome initiative has inspired or compelled a number of international and national bodies to make policy statements on the "patentability" of the human genome or more simply, of genes. Since the gene is the basic unit of life, positions on patenting the human genome may be determinant of the patentability of other bodily parts and tissue. Moreover, an examination of the international (§ A), regional (§ B), and national (§ C) position on patenting reveals that a clarification of patenting issues may well put the property-person debate to rest.
§ A - International Positions
At the international level, two positions have been endorsed with respect to the patentability of the human genome or parts of it. The first, simply states that no patents should be given(128). The second position qualifies this "blanket" refusal by maintaining that no patents should be allowed on genes per se, but accepts that uses or applications of genes or sequences can be patented(129). A 1995 statement by the international Human Genome Organization(130) (HUGO) further clarified the issue of patentability of DNA sequences by distinguishing between different steps in the research process of molecular biology and by qualifying what is "discovered" at each step. Thus, HUGO recommended that routine procedures such as sequencing expressed sequence tags or genes should not be patentable(131) , while the "more difficult and significant discoveries"(132) of determining the underlying biological functions should receive patent protection.
§ B - Regional Positions
At the regional European level, a 1991 Working Group of the European Commission(133) opposed patenting the human genome or any part of it since granting patents for DNA sequences with unknown utility could have an inhibitory effect on research(134). Again, this would not exclude patent protection of products or processes that are the result of innovative research. It is also interesting to note that an earlier 1988 draft directive of the European Parliament and Council, aimed at providing clear guidelines without modifying existing legislation on the patentability of human genes, was finally rejected in 1995(135). This directive sought to prohibit patenting of elements of the human body as such, but allowed patenting of inventions that included elements of the human body modified in such a way that they could no longer be directly linked to a specific individual. As a consequence of the rejection of the Directive, applications for gene patents in Europe will remain subject to national law and to a case by case interpretation by the European Patent Office under the unchanged European Patent Convention(136).
§ C - National Positions
At the national level, the clearest position on whether genes should be offered patent protection, is found in French legislation. In 1994, the French legislature enacted amendments to its intellectual property code declaring unpatentable "...the human body and its elements and products, as well as knowledge of the total or partial structure of a human gene"(137) (since contrary to public order). Earlier national reports in France had already come to this position(138).
In 1994, the Danish Council of Ethics produced a report that specifically addressed the issue of patenting human genes(139). It endorsed the position that patents should not be allowed on human genes in naturally occurring form, allowing, however, patenting of the information content of DNA sequences, in the manufacture of a specific product(140). The Danish Council further proposed that a forum be established in order to continuously monitor developments in the legal protection of biotechnical inventions.
The Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in its 1993 report on Biotechnology related to Human Beings, did not recommend that human cells and genes be explicitly excluded from patent protection but only that current patent criteria be applied. In the Ministry's view, "genes that have no known function will not be patentable in Norway because they do not fulfil the requirements for patentability."(141) Thus, the simple application of the current Norwegian law was deemed sufficient to decline patents on human genes and cells.
In the United Kingdom, the 1995 report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics extensively covered the issue of patentability of inventions derived from human tissue with particular reference to the "immorality exclusion" criteria (public order) of the European Patent Convention(142). The Nuffield Council remarked that "human genes, human cells, and the products and processes derived from them are already patentable (and patented) under European patent law"(143) since they have not been excluded on the basis of immorality, restrictively interpreted by the European Patent Office. However, the Report noted that oppositions to awarded patents had been filed and that a body of opinion believes that the immorality exclusion deserves clarification(144). Indeed, the rejection of the European draft Directive in 1995 as mentioned above, exemplifies the continuing controversy over this issue. Because of this situation, the Nuffield Council made several recommendations. First, the notion of invention requires that "some technical intervention should have taken place that justifies the granting of an intellectual property right."(145) Second, the Nuffield Council recommended that in the interpretation of the exclusion based on immorality (public order), account be taken of ethical factors and sensitivities in the patenting of inventions derived from human tissue."(146) Finally, it recommended that clarification of the immorality exclusion be attempted once more in a protocol that could be adopted under the European Patent Convention.
Later in 1995, in a report on human genetics(147), the UK. House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology made a recommendation precluding patenting of gene or gene fragments of unknown function concluding that only a combination of a gene and a known utility which is novel and not obvious should be patentable in the context of that utility. In addition, a combination of the same gene and a further novel utility should also be patentable. Interestingly, the Committee considered that the exclusion from patentability on the grounds of immorality should remain "narrowly construed, rarely applied, and then only in extreme cases."(148) The increased importance given to the concept of human dignity by the European Parliament was not deemed "inconsistent with the proper use of patenting in creating conditions in which new therapies can be developed to relieve suffering and improve the quality of life."(149) Concern was raised, however, that patent examiners apply the novelty and utility criteria too loosely with over-generous patents being granted. Due to the absence of provisions in the European Patent Convention to challenge the scope of patent claims, the Committee called for review of grounds under which opposition to patents may be filed(150).
In the United States, there is no such exclusion based on the notion of public order. Rather, the debate has focused on the question of sharing of profits gained through patent protection and only to a lesser extent on the patentability of inventions derived from human tissues(151). In 1991, however, the NIH patent applications for thousands of partial complementary DNA sequences of unknown function raised much polemic in scientific, industrial and lay gro ups(152). The NIH policy justification for such an application was that patent protection would promote product development by US. industries through the granting of exclusive licenses over DNA sequences(153). The scientific community opposed this application considering it an obstacle to technology transfer and product development rather than an incentive. The NIH patent application was denied since it lacked patentable novelty and utility, the functions of the cDNA being unknown(154). In spite of this ruling, as the above survey of the literature demonstrates, the debate on the issue of granting patent protection over human genetic material with no known function continues.
Finally, in Canada, few policy statements have been made on this issue. In its report on tissue procurement and transfer, the 1991 Law Reform Commission report asked "whether there is something intrinsically wrong with patenting human life, particularly human life forms. That human life forms have formally been patentable subject-matter in Canada since the early 1980s may suggest that it is not."(155) In contrast, the 1993 report of the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies considered that the patenting of human cell lines raises some concern and, as already mentioned, asks for further study(156). In addition, the commissioners held that human zygotes, embryos, and fetuses are inappropriate subject matter for intellectual property protection(157). In its general principles regarding intellectual property rights, the Canadian Genome Analysis and Technology Program (CGAT) does not consider the issue of gene patenting. CGAT simply states that researchers supported by the program may seek intellectual property protection for their inventions providing that publication is not denied(158).
In short, intellectual property rights for persons who contribute their human genetic material to research that eventually leads to inventions awarded patent protection is still under discussion. Potential claims to a share of patent profits by contributors may be summarized in two general tendencies as found in policy positions according to the person-property dichotomy. Under a personality rights approach, where human material is usually considered as extra-commercial, a person has no right to claim a share of profits derived from patents on inventions containing their bodily material. However, during the process of obtaining informed consent from the sample "sources", some have suggested that the person should be informed of whether a share of any potential profits can be expected by the researcher, the institution and possibly by the participant(159). Accordingly, under this approach, contractual institutional arrangements could be drawn up in which the person's right to a share of eventual profits derived from patents is ensured through the informed consent mechanism. Similarly, under a property rights approach, ab initioproprietary interests in the removed material could extend beyond the raw material to include rightful claims of a share of profits on any patented inventions containing the sample, provided that there is no legal authority to the contrary(160). Individual "bargaining" or exploitation under these approaches cannot be ruled out. In any event, another possibility would be to provide a percentage of eventual profits not to the individual participant or patient but to a non profit foundation or organization whose goal is to educate and help lay members with that disease. Hence, the issue of whether individuals maintain any claims over profits derived from removed bodily material remains unclear and merits continued discussion.
Whatever the type of arrangement convened with respect to sharing profits from patent protection, there will be implications for individuals who contribute their bodily material, to researchers as well as to institutions where research is conducted(161). For example, will the remote hope of obtaining a share of profits influence individual's informed consent? Will researchers who offer a share in their potential profits be considered as imposing undue inducement on their potential sample contributors? How and under what form will profits be redistributed? In large research projects, how will the value of one person's genetic material be evaluated with respect to other people's material also studied? What will the institution's duty be in such a context? Are there other models for potential profit sharing that are not patent law based? Finally, how will any compensation scheme realistically be implemented?


Banking of Human Materials, Intellectual Property Rights and Ownership Issues: International Policy Positions and Emerging Trends in the Literature: Conclusion
Pevious Table of Content Next
Conclusions
Whether drawing its origins from the sale-gift debate that has dominated the organ transplant debate for years, or from the property-person debate in the legal literature on other human tissue, it is evident that the advent of DNA banking has forced a re-examination of the issues. While the dichotomy is still philosophically relevant, the solutions proposed share common elements: expanded forms of control through a more extensive and detailed informed consent procedure, through access, storage and destruction options and through the provision of explicit written policies and choices for possible research. The issue of possible commercialism through payment for procurement or even through a sharing of eventual profits is then secondary in importance. With the future expansion of international and North American "biotech" industry into Canada, other ways than possible (and generally highly hypothetical) individual financial rewards of returning benefits to scientific research, to the patient associations and the research participants need to be developed with the stakeholders.
Moreover, the issue of patentability is international. While the exact form of such expanded consent and sharing of profits is largely culturally dependant and should remain so in order to respect cultural diversity, patent law with respect to human genetic material is definitely an international issue. An explicit national, regional and international reaffirmation of patent law principles together with a clarification of how they apply to the specific situation of "uses" discovered for human genes may be the first step towards a necessary consensus that respects research participants and scientific endeavour.
** Addendum: Three-way European discussions, between the the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, are to take place in January 1996 to decide whether to propose a new draft directive on the issue of patenting biotechnologies. This initiative follows from the unexpected rejection, in March 1995 by the European Parliament of the previous directive. The new draft directive is not yet publicly available(162).

Stressing out

For the past week or two I have been really stressing about my grades. I have not been doing as well as i hoped that i would in my classes. The first class that i have been stressing about is chemistry. I have been stressing over that class because I did not do well on the mid-term. I studied the wrong material and the grade shows it. I am going to do my best though and bring it up as much as I can. That is all that I can do right now. The second class that I have been stressing about is anthropology. I have been stressing about this class because we took a mid-term over things from the book and the class lectures. Well we really have not even opened the book since I have been in the class, but the test is on things that are from the book. I do not think that I did well on that test either. So it looks like I have a lot of work to do in order to bring up my grades now.

Jackson Show

In band we have started to learn our Michael Jackson show which includes Thriller and a medley of his tunes. I am kind of nervous about this show because I found out that we will be learning and doing a dance during part of the show. First of all I am not the greatest dancer in the world; in my perspective I am kind of awkward with some dances. This dance is during thriller and I am in the front close to the sideline. This means that i will actually have to do pretty good at it because if I do not then it will be very noticeable. Also the band will be performing it at the game on Tuesday and then again on Halloween for bandmasters. Bandmasters is the competition that the band hosts for high schools; it is also a pretty big competition for high school bands. We are performing it at the competition for our exhibition. This is to showcase the Mighty Sound of the South to all of the high schools that are there. So I am really nervous about this dance.

bibliography 1

Tissues as property: annotative bibliography
　
　
Dry, S. (2009). Who Owns Diagnostic Tissue Blocks?. Lab Med 40: 69-73

This article talks about the lawsuits, and how the tissues are being used in studies. It describes the laws and regulations of removing the tissues from people and how the person has to give the doctor consent to do this. It also lets the reader know that if the tissue was removed without permission then it could be considered as battery or something similar to it.
　
　
　
　
　
　
　
Dry, S. (2009). Who Owns Diagnostic Tissue Blocks?. Lab Med 40: 69-73 [Full Text]
　
　
　
Body of Research — Ownership and Use of Human Tissue
R. Alta Charo, J.D
For better or worse, we have irretrievably entered an age that requires examination of our understanding of the legal rights and relationships in the human body and the human cell.
— Moore v. Regents of the University of California, California 2nd District Court of Appeals, 1988
Nearly 20 years after the California courts decided Moore v. Regents — a seminal case concerning a patient's interest in the profits derived from patents on a cell line generated from his spleen tissue — U.S. jurisprudence still has no coherent answer to a deceptively simple question: Do we own our own bodies?
Why deceptively simple? Because the meaning of "property" is unclear. Because the question must be asked about our relationships both to our bodies and to our excised body tissue. And because it must be asked about those relationships both before and after we die.
No brief article or single court opinion could address all the complexities of the legal notion of "property." But simple or not, the question of whether we "own" our bodies must be answered soon: courts now face multiple controversies concerning the use of bits and pieces of bodies — and their derivatives — that are scattered among pathology laboratories, state hygiene laboratories, museums, archives, sperm banks, fertility clinics, and forensic DNA collections. One recent controversy concerns William Catalona, a prostate cancer surgeon and researcher formerly employed by Washington University in St. Louis. Over the course of decades, and with his patients' consent, Catalona amassed more than 3500 tissue samples, developed the prostate-specific antigen test, and led clinical trials to improve testing for prostate cancer. When he left for another university, Catalona asked his patient-donors to write to Washington University requesting that their tissue samples be sent to his new place of employment. Washington University refused to send them, and a dispute arose about the patients' right to control the tissue.
On the basis of the terms of the consent documents signed when the patients originally released their tissue, the court ruled that control belonged to Washington University and that although patients might ask that their samples be destroyed, they could not direct that they be delivered to Catalona or to another university. Left unclear in the court's opinion is whether the patients ever had a property interest in their tissues. One reading suggests they did but that they relinquished it upon donation; another suggests that they never had such an interest, even while the tissues were in their living bodies.
The court's ruling on the narrower issue of control of the excised tissues had some basis in precedent. A smattering of other decisions, concerning state laws covering presumed consent for the donation of cadaveric corneas, management of frozen embryos whose progenitors are still alive, and postmortem control of stored semen, suggested that donors might have some property rights in their tissues. But in two other decisions, the Moore case of 1988 (concerning rights to share in commercial gain from derivatives of tissue taken without proper informed consent) and the Greenberg case of 2003 (concerning property rights in tissue and genetic information derived from patients' tissues), courts found that state law provided little basis for granting patients a property interest in their voluntarily donated, excised tissue.
Those courts did not delve deeply into the possible existence of property rights to such tissue before excision. If, on the one hand, there are no such rights, then the Catalona decision is not a question of the evaporation of a property interest after donation but a finding that we have no property right to our tissues before or after they leave our bodies. According to this view, any right we may have to control the use of our tissue rests on other considerations, such as the privacy of medical information or entitlements created through the regulation of research on human subjects. If, on the other hand, such a property right does exist, then any conclusion about whether donation constitutes a relinquishment of that right depends on the fairness of the transaction and the quality of the information provided before consent is given. Such distinctions have powerful implications for medical research.
At present, research regulations are built on a theory of autonomy that is independent of any property right in one's tissue. Thus, although in general patients can refuse or consent to the donation of tissue samples for research, such rights are quite limited. Common law protects people from involuntary excision of body tissue, which would be considered battery. But after the tissue has been properly excised, its use without the patient's consent may be permitted under federal research regulations, if the patient's identity is unknown or adequately obscured.1
Federal regulations are based on a notion of voluntarism, but the right to refuse participation in research is based more on ensuring that subjects can be the ones to judge how to protect their own interests than on a pure form of autonomous decision making, which would include a right to refuse for any reason or no reason at all. Hence, no consent is required for research deemed to pose minimal risk to subjects — or for research in which identifying information is obscured or from which it has been deleted (which protects privacy and minimizes social risks such as stigmatization or discrimination, but does nothing to recognize subjects' autonomy). And when patients' preferences regarding the kinds of research that may be performed on their tissue are ascertained, this is done as a courtesy, rather than as recognition of patients' rights to prohibit the use of their tissues for purposes of which they disapprove. In a battle over such rights, the Havasupai tribe is suing researchers who took blood for a diabetes-control project and later used it in research about schizophrenia within the tribal community.2 Although institutions may be disciplined by federal authorities for regulatory lapses, courts have so far refused to recognize a private legal claim based on this sort of alleged violation of the requirements of consent for research.
In other settings, however, calls for increased control by patients over the use of their tissue would suggest that only subsuming the matter under property law would suffice.3 In the emerging field of regenerative medicine, for example, California's new funding regulations require researchers to honor the limits set by donors of embryos or gametes on the kinds of work that can be done even with donated tissue that has been "anonymized" — a rule consistent with a theory of property rights in tissue. In the field of biobanking (the collection and distribution of tissue and DNA samples), some have called for caution in the common practice of asking donors to waive all rights, on the assumption that property rights exist and waivers may be ineffective if they do not satisfy all the legal rules for property transfers.4
Investigators and universities have argued that recognizing property rights in excised tissue would threaten their ability to use stored tissue samples effectively5 — a use that is essential to everything from advances in pharmacogenomics and genetic epidemiology, to the development of new tests for clinically significant mutations, to the investigation of historical events and epidemics through the medical testing of cadavers.
Ultimately, the debate is less about whether the management of human tissue should be governed by property laws or by a more robust regulatory scheme than about the proper balance between respect for persons and the collective interest in promoting research involving human tissue. Respect for persons and their autonomy can be promoted through many legal frameworks. In one framework, autonomy is premised on the notion that one's body is one's property and that uninvited removal or use of tissue is theft or trespass. In the other, autonomy is premised on the liberty interests of the person within the body (such as the freedom from assault), and the uninvited removal or use of tissue is an injury and a deprivation of liberty.
Despite its apparent clarity, the property-based approach creates new dilemmas that we are hardly ready to confront. If I "own" my tissue, do I have all the rights usually associated with property? Calling something property does not necessarily mean that its owner has all possible rights to its exclusive use, donation, sale, alteration, and destruction, but this is a common bundle of rights associated with ownership of property. If this pattern were extended to tissues, then selling organs might become a matter of right. And cadaveric tissue could become the property of heirs, rendering unusable even old repositories such as the one used to sequence the 1918 influenza virus. Of course, labeling something as "property" does not foreclose limitations on its use: governments can sometimes take property for public purposes or forbid its sale or alteration. But generally, calling something "property" will enhance the owner's interests considerably, especially with regard to prohibiting others from using it.
Alternatively, our relationship with our bodies may be viewed as a trusteeship: even if they are not our property, we nonetheless have extensive and exclusive rights with respect to them, at least while we are alive and our bodies are intact. Even with such a view, bodies and tissues may also be viewed as part of a common heritage of humanity, to be used for the collective good if such use does not unduly infringe on our liberties. This leads to arguments for a public right to use excised tissue, provided that due care is taken to protect the privacy and social interests of the person from whom it comes. Such arguments also support a policy of "presumed consent" for the use of cadavers for tissue and organ transplantation.
Moving in this direction would still require attention to respecting the interests of persons who do not wish to be research subjects or who fear the invasion of privacy or social interests that examination of their tissues might entail. Regulation of the management of banked tissue could address these questions. But recharacterizing our bodies as a public resource would also suggest an ethical duty to work toward a just distribution of the benefits of such research, both financial and therapeutic. Without some symmetry between the burdens and the benefits of research, the social compact underlying such an imposition on personal interests would be undermined.
Although treating our bodies and tissues as property would offer an avenue toward strong protection of personal autonomy, it is not the only way to accomplish this goal. Nor is it without costs, in terms of possible losses to the collective interest in research and organ donation. Other systems, whether based on enhanced regulations protecting human subjects or a theory of trusteeship, could serve as well. But whichever system is chosen, it is long past time for the country to choose. State laws vary, federal regulations do not apply to all privately funded research, and a patchwork of rules cover the myriad laboratories and biobanks in the United States. Our tissue may be scattered. Our laws ought not to be.